Cette étude se concentre sur l’impact de la Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) en Asie du Sud, plus particulièrement en Inde, au Pakistan et au Sri Lanka – trois pays centraux dans la reconfiguration géopolitique de l’Asie et de la région de l’océan Indien.

China is propagating its "Belt & Road Initiative" as a development initiative for the Eurasian continent, thereby pursuing geopolitical ambitions. Yet Europe need not feel small in light of China’s efforts. As a comparison of Western and Chinese financial flows reveals: The West is investing just as much in countries of the so-called "Silk Road" and is the better partner for many countries.

Before the deployment of the new Silk Road, Chinese diplomacy had never arrived with so much momentum to the heart of Europe. The future success of the goals set by Beijing to become a leading global power will depend on the lessons learned since the initiative was launched six years ago and, on the need, to successfully respond to new and changing circumstances. The new Silk Road enters a second phase where to reduce criticism and recalibrate the deployment strategy all over the Corridors is a priority. Now, the strategic projects in the countries that have formally endorse the initiative will set the pace of the expansion of China's diplomacy, with Europe in the spotlight.

Entretien avec Thierry Kellner. "Il ne s’agit pas d’un projet multilatéral. La BRI est par définition une proposition unilatérale de la Chine. Elle ne cherche ni à transformer les institutions existantes ni à discuter réellement avec ses partenaires dans le cadre de forum institutionnalisé. (...) la BRI est le prolongement d’un projet domestique ayant vocation au développement économique du pays et donc à assurer la position de pouvoir du PCC. Il y a aussi un volet international, car la BRI permet de renforcer la position et le statut de la Chine et de diffuser une image que l’on veut positive."

Le gouvernement chinois joue actuellement un rôle clé pour soutenir l’ambition internationale en matière de climat et de biodiversité, et présente les Nouvelles Routes de la soie (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) comme un projet global permettant de réaliser l’Agenda 2030 pour le développement durable. Réussir à faire de la BRI un levier de transformation vers le développement durable constitue donc un enjeu stratégique pour la Chine autant que pour le reste du monde.

This essay discusses the evolution of a new security actor - Chinese private security companies (PSCs) - and examines how PSCs guard Chinese interests abroad. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which crosses many geographic borders, is expanding rapidly. As BRI spreads around the globe, the country must address a new set of problems and risks. Primary among these is the fact that China is now deepening its economic and personnel footprint in countries with serious political and security problems. An alternative pathway for the deployment of armed forces is the expansion of the Chinese private security industry.

Kazakhstan is a linchpin for trade and transport links on the Eurasian continent – for China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and beyond – due to its location, vast landmass and energy reserves. It is both the object and the subject of Chinese, Russian and Western geopolitical interests. The Kazakhstani case shows that the shape and success of the BRI largely depend on internal, not external, factors.

This paper argues that with more objectives added since its inception in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved into a much more expansive grand strategy that includes a package of themes and goals. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state-owned banks have dominated investment and financing for BRI projects, which explains the root of the problems and risks facing the initiative, such as unsustainable debt, non-transparency, corruption and low economic efficiency.

The study shows that the volume of Chinese financial flows to the Belt & Road region is actually considerably lower than has generally been assumed in the public debate and that a considerable amount of funding is flowing from the West to countries participating in the Belt & Road Initiative.

La dimensione energetica costituisce una componente fondamentale per la realizzazione della Belt and Road Initiative... Nei prossimi anni, la Cina sarà chiamata ad individuare quei progetti infrastrutturali destinati a rafforzare efficacemente la sicurezza energetica nazionale, da finanziare come “progetti BRI”.

Innovation and the Digital Silk Road are moving to the forefront of Beijing’s efforts to develop the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 1/ Beijing has greatly expanded the scope of the Digital Silk Road 2/ Thriving Chinese tech giants are called upon to support the BRI 3/ China’s Digital Silk Road challenges European norms and businesses

Concern about China’s role in Africa’s economic development is mounting. Chinese finance and investment on the continent is frequently folded into all-encompassing neocolonial narratives about Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and so-called “debt-trap diplomacy.” Yet African governments by-and-large do not endorse these concerns and many continue to pursue closer ties with China.

Make no mistake about China’s vast and continuous trajectory of technological expansionism. Even as the US aims to ring-fence Huawei’s reach into the US and overseas consumer markets, a “digital silk road” paved by Chinese tech giants has long been built to span from the Asia-Pacific to the Gulf and Africa. It remains a question, however, whether this digital silk road offers a long-term competitive advantage for emerging economies also joined in China’s prized Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In the Arabian Sea, competition has been building for the past few years over control of the strategic ports adjacent to major trade routes. From the international angle, therefore, port development in this region is an integral piece in the competing geo-economic plans of China (BRI) and India (Look West) to develop new trade routes to markets in West Asia and Africa. From the strategic angle, the US (in collaboration with India and the UK) is trying to obstruct China’s march forward.

Starting from January 2015, Russia and several neighboring Central Asian republics formed an economic union known as the Eurasian Economics Union, (EAEU). The purpose of the EAEU is to create a single economics space. Contemporary to this new Russian led economic union is China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) plan. Since the EAEU and the BRI plan share compatible goals, a partnership can exist benefiting both China and the EAEU. Therefore, it will be in the EAEU’s interest to promote and cooperate with China’s BRI initiative in the region.

Starting from January 2015, Russia and several neighboring Central Asian republics formed an economic union known as the Eurasian Economics Union, (EAEU). The purpose of the EAEU is to create a single economics space. Contemporary to this new Russian led economic union is China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) plan. Since the EAEU and the BRI plan share compatible goals, a partnership can exist benefiting both China and the EAEU. Therefore, it will be in the EAEU’s interest to promote and cooperate with China’s BRI initiative in the region.

Russia-China relations are often displayed as a strategic partnership. In how far the strategic partnership benefits both countries is analysed with a focus on Russia´s interest in Central Asia as well as China´s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau, which make up the Freely Associated States — as well as the broader region of Oceania — have been the subject of increasing Chinese influence and expressions of both hard and soft power. The authors of this report examine the implications of these activities for the United States, particularly in terms of its defense and foreign policy interests. They also look at the actions of other regional and international powers in the Freely Associated States, and examine how those actions complement U.S. leadership.

During the spring of 2019, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) notched up some notable successes. In March, Italy became the first major Western country to sign up as a participant. Then in April, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced that his country would proceed with the BRI-backed East Coast Rail Link, a railway project across peninsular Malaysia. His revelation at the BRI’s second forum in Beijing reversed his government’s earlier statements that it would cancel the project. The two successes were much needed after a year or more of unrelenting headwinds for the BRI.

You're listening to The Trade Guys, a podcast produced by CSIS where we talk about trade in terms that everyone can understand. I'm H. Andrew Schwartz, and I'm here with Scott Miller and Bill Reinsch, the CSIS Trade Guys. In this episode, we're going to talk the topsy-turvy situation with China, what's going on this week with the markets, with the currency manipulation accusation. What is going on with the U.S. and China? Plus, we welcome a special in-house guest. Jon Hillman is a senior fellow with the CSIS Simon Chair. Jon also directs the Reconnecting Asia Project at CSIS, which tracks new roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure across Eurasia and China's Belt and Road Initiative. We'll discuss what the Belt and Road Initiative is, how it might be affecting global trade, and what the initiative says about China's economic vision. You'll hear all that and more on this episode of The Trade Guys.

In 2012, China and 11 EU countries from Central and Southern Europe and 5 non-EU members from the Western Balkans met in Warsaw, Poland for the first time in a “16+1” format to deepen economic cooperation in the areas of infrastructure as well as information and green technological development. The occasion was marked by the signing of “China’s Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries” and the official launch of the 16+1...

It’s 2028. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been underway for 15 years, but the initial enthusiasm and momentum behind BRI has vanished. Many of the governments that initially joined the initiative have publicly withdrawn or quietly wound down their participation. China’s staunchest allies remain engaged but even they have reservations about the wisdom of the initiative. They are saddled with unproductive public investment projects and struggling to service their debts. Domestic public sentiment towards China has soured, and they have come to view their participation in BRI as more of a political liability than an asset. But they worry about the consequences of alienating their most important patron and creditor. China has also assumed a defensive posture. Lacking the goodwill that it possessed at the beginning of BRI, it is now using inducements and threats to prevent its remaining clients from abandoning the initiative...

The Belt and Road Initiative, the most important foreign policy initiative ever undertaken by the People’s Republic of China, offers a useful blueprint but suffers from a lack of clarity: Everything, it seems, is part of the BRI. There are two types of BRI projects being implemented in the Gulf states – those that support Gulf domestic development programs and those that build regional connectivity, and the latter type demonstrates more about what Beijing wants to achieve in the Middle East...

This August, I will be departing on a 4,300 km expedition, tracing the length of the China-Russia border to locate, track, and document the progress of flagship and lesser-known Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects. Although this border region lies several thousand kilometers away from Beijing, its relevance and importance to China’s security, economy, and broader relations with Russia cannot be understated...

The Belt and Road Initiative and the “free and open” Indo-Pacific are competing initiatives. However, the real choice will be made by developing states, who are currently leveraging both initiatives to obtain better deals. It’s not inconceivable that in the long term, some multilateral arrangement will accommodate both initiatives.

China isn’t just the world’s largest exporter of goods: It’s now the world’s largest exporter of capital, too. Of course, these two facts are linked. China earns so much from being the world’s factory, and the spending of its households is so constrained, that it needs to find somewhere to park the difference. That’s the basic imbalance underlying the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s big push into the developing world...

- The Chinese government has begun to call for a "high-quality Belt and Road Initiative".- At the same time, more multifaceted issues and softer approaches have become apparent.- It is hoped that the Chinese government will be more pro-active in releasing relevant data.

At the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation April, China’s Ministry of Finance released a debt sustainability framework (DSF) for the Belt and Road initiative (BRI). This follows a shift in rhetoric from Chinese officials in the face of growing concerns highlighted by CGD’s research about debt vulnerabilities under the initiative: in recent months, Chinese policymakers have moved away from denying any problems with BRI lending to acknowledging the debt risks of large-scale lending and pointing to the need for more disciplined lending.

Les entreprises étrangères peuvent-elles tirer profit des projets d'infrastructure chinois à l'étranger ? Ont-elles besoin d'un soutien politique pour y parvenir ? Ces deux questions irriguent les débats en matière de coopération dans les marchés tiers, débats qui ont lieu dans plusieurs capitales et dans de nombreux sièges d'entreprises. La Chine a signé des accords de coopération marchés tiers avec la France, les Pays-Bas, la Belgique, l'Espagne, l'Autriche, le Japon, Singapour et l'Australie. Néanmoins, ces accords n'ont jusqu’à présent rien changé de fondamental au fait que les projets d'infrastructure chinois offrent peu d'opportunités aux entreprises étrangères. Un rapport du Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) daté de janvier 2018 indiquait que, parmi les projets connus dans le cadre des nouvelles routes de la soie, seuls 3,4 % impliquaient la participation d'entreprises étrangères "tierces". En dépit de l’absence de statistiques consolidées à jour, les informations disponibles suggèrent que rien n'a fondamentalement changé depuis janvier 2018...

On Richard T. Griffiths’s book, Revitalising the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Leiden, HIPE Publication, 2017.

- China’s investment and construction around the world plunged in the first half of 2019 and is unlikely to return to 2016–17 levels in the foreseeable future. The principal cause is fewer large transactions by state-owned enterprises. These firms rely on foreign currency provided by Beijing for global activities, and hard currency may be rationed indefinitely.- There are brighter spots. The raw number of investments held up better than transaction size. The private share of China’s global investment climbed, and the greenfield share rose sharply. Investment in the Belt and Road Initiative outperformed that in traditionally favored rich economies such as Australia.- Chinese investment in the US has been minor in size for two years. Policymakers should shift focus from screening to unwanted activity by Chinese firms, including intellectual property theft and other criminal acts. Enforcement targeting specific firms is superior to tariffs but should go beyond largely empty steps taken to date.

President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping and President of the United States Donald Trump met on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Osaka on June 29 to discuss the resumption of trade and economic talks between the two countries. The United States also promised that it would not introduce additional tariffs on Chinese goods. The world collectively breathed a sigh of relief, as the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is fraught with serious risks for global economic growth...

China’s presence in Africa is steadily on the rise. One of the key channels through which China is influencing Africa’s economy is investment, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative. Europe has traditionally been the largest investor in Africa, and the rise of Chinese investments is challenging the status quo. This panel discussion, chaired by Bruegel’s Deputy Director Maria Demertzis, reviewed the key traits of Chinese investment in Africa, both geographically and sector-wise, and its impact on European investors in the African region.

In early June, Prime Minister Imran Khan agreed to Pakistan’s thirteenth IMF bailout in the last thirty years. Facing a balance of payments crisis and foreign exchange reserves insufficient to cover even three months of imports, Pakistan will assume austerity measures in order to receive $6 billion of rescue funds from the international lender. Khan, who once declared that he “prefer[red] death to the begging bowl,” now finds himself dependent on external financing to fulfill the lofty development goals on which he campaigned in 2018.Perhaps the biggest target of austerity is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), originally a $62 billion series of infrastructure projects aimed at improving Pakistan’s transport and energy infrastructure. Once viewed as Pakistan’s great hope for job creation and economic development, this leg of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is subject to an estimated 60 percent spending cut in Pakistan’s latest budget...

There are a number of easy myths to dispel about China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It’s worth trillions — false. China is buying up the participating countries — if so, only in self-defeating fashion. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is primarily about transportation — reasonable but still mostly wrong.Perhaps the most important mistake is that the BRI represents a growing Chinese footprint globally. It did in 2016, not now. More countries are joining the BRI in name but the extent of activity is shrinking. Moreover, inadequate foreign currency reserves means Beijing will be hard pressed to keep the BRI afloat as a global commercial effort. It is therefore likely to devolve toward a talk shop with substantial resources assigned only to a small set of priority countries.

Climate change is the battle of the century. According to a 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report, the global temperature rise will likely 1.5°C as early as 2030. We may only have 12 years to act decisively in order to avoid catastrophic impacts on the planet and human beings...

The relationship between China and the world now is changing. The McKinsey Global Institute’s (MGI) new China-World Exposure Index shows that the world’s relative exposure to China has increased, while China’s to the world has fallen. Accompanying this shifting exposure are the signs of stresses in the relationship. Trade disputes are making daily headlines, new rules are emerging to evaluate technology flows, protectionism is on the rise, and geopolitical tensions are becoming more heated. The way ahead is uncertain. Could we be at peak integration between China and the world after the years of deepening ties? Conversely, what opportunities could more engagement offer? What value could be at stake for all players?

An Israeli analyst shares observations from an intensive round of discussions with senior Chinese military, diplomatic, and academic officials.

Hi, I'm Devin Stewart here at Carnegie Council in New York City. I'm here with Giulio Pugliese. He is a visiting scholar at the Reischauer Center at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC...

China’s rise from a poor developing country to a major economic power in about four decades has been spectacular. From 1979(when economic reforms began) to 2017, China’s real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of nearly10%.1According to the World Bank, China has “experiencedthe fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history—and has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty.”2China has emerged as a major global economic power. For example, it ranks first in terms of economic sizeon a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, value-added manufacturing, merchandise trade, and holder of foreign exchange reserves...

As China seeks to improve the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in response to criticisms, Southeast Asia could tap growth opportunities by leveraging on the strengths of BRI-linked countries such as in finance, partnerships, negotiations and economic development.

The World Bank just released a report on the economics of China’sBelt and Road Initiative (BRI). It provides estimates of the potential of Belt and Road transport corridors for enhancing trade, foreign investment, and living conditions for people in the countries that they connect. The report also tries to answer an important question: What happens to the internal geography of countries when they increase connections with others?

For each bold move abroad, from the Belt and Road Initiative to island building, China seems confronted with new vulnerabilities at home, including the ongoing protests in Hong Kong. Jessica Chen Weiss, author of an intriguing new essay in Foreign Affairs, and Ali Wyne of the Rand Corporation join Deep Dish to discuss what is intrinsic and what is incidental to Beijing’s ambitions.

From Convergence to Competition - The purpose of this paper is to analyze how China’s new power is reaching Europe, the challenges that it poses, and the European responses to this new reality. This process has to be examined in the context of the current strategic competition between China and the U.S. and its reflection on the transatlantic relationship...

North Africa is expected to become home to some massive infrastructural projects, including Morocco’s Tangier Med Port and Egypt’s new administrative capital, after all of the countries in the region signed up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While much has been written about the physical infrastructure under the BRI umbrella, China’s ambition to extend its digital footprint in North Africa has received far less attention despite the significant economic, political and strategic implications.

With the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region as an expanded theatre of U.S.-China rivalry epitomized in the call by Washington for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific andChina’s Belt and Road Initiative, Indonesia has taken the ASEAN lead in developing a framework to lessen regional tensions and to promote cooperation.

In January 2018, the Chinese Communist Party put forward a Central Committee Opinion developing the idea for creating a Chinese international commercial court, aimed at servicing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) disputes. Six months later, two Chinese International Commercial Courts (CICC) were established to deal with maritime and overland trade cases with minimum claims of approximately 44.5 million USD. These courts are a logical step for securing China’s interests in light of the estimated five trillion USD of BRI investment, which has been on very rocky waters. Multiple BRI-related cases have already taken place in various international courts, and more can be expected.

China is working overtime to shore up the reputation of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).Perhaps most notably, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) was contracted to offer infrastructure support at the Italian ports of Trieste and Genoa.Arguably more problematic is the prospect that Italy’s decision could ease the pressure on Beijing to reform the initiative.

This week, 3 CSIS experts discuss the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s global strategy to be at the center of global economics through infrastructure, trade, and energy projects. In the years since BRI was launched, definitions and expectations for BRI projects and financing have changed. In April, over 3 dozen countries met in China for the second Belt and Road summit, which was posed answer some of the new project concerns which have arisen, including local impacts, environmental concerns, debt, and lack of transparency.

The Kunming-Vientiane (K-V) railway, part of the Kunming-Singapore multi-country rail network (or “Pan-Asia Railway”), is an anchor investment of the Chinese government’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI). This case study will assess the rail project along four dimensions: economic implications; procurement arrangements; labor; and environmental and social safeguards. In each of these areas, evidence from the railway project suggests that Chinese policy and practice could be better aligned with the practices of other sources of multilateral and bilateral development finance. Where the project’s standards are broadly aligned, at least in principle, there is nonetheless reason to believe that China’s approach carries heightened risks given the overall scale of financing...

Energy projects have always been a major part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure mega-plan for Eurasia. The enormity of that plan was on display at the BRI Forum last month, where an official report was released estimating that energy investments in BRI countries would add up to $27 trillion by 2050, with $7 trillion alone going to power grid construction, and over 200 million new jobs created in the process.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse...